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How Sensitive Are Retirement Decisions to Financial Incentives: 
A Stated Preference Analysis
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We study effects of financial incentives on the retirement age using stated preference data. 
Dutch survey respondents were given hypothetical retirement scenarios describing age(s) of 
(partial and full) retirement and replacement rate(s). A structural model is estimated in which 
utility is the discounted sum of within period utilities that depend on employment status and 
income. Parameters of the utility function vary with observed and unobserved characteristics. 
Simulations show that the income and substitution effects of pensions as a function of the 
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We analyze stated preference data on retirement. Survey respondents of ages 25 and older 
in the Netherlands were given hypothetical retirement scenarios describing the age(s) of 
(partial and full) retirement and corresponding replacement rates. Several types of retirement 
trajectories were considered – with retirement before, at, or after the standard retirement age 
(65 years), with and without gradual retirement, and with various replacement rates during 
partial and full retirement. The data were collected in 2006, 2007 and 2008, partly for the 
same respondents. 
 
The SP data are used to estimate an intertemporal utility model in which the individual’s utility 
is the discounted sum of within period utilities that depend on employment status (working, 
partially retired, or (fully) retired) and income in that period. Parameters of the utility function 
vary with observed and unobserved respondent characteristics and the year of data 
collection. The estimated model is used to analyze how retirement preferences differ by 
background characteristics and how they evolve over the survey years. Simulating the choice 
of the retirement age under actuarially fair and unfair trade-offs, we then analyze how the 
preferred retirement age changes if pension income levels change irrespective of the 
retirement age (the “(pension) income effect”), or if the pension benefit accrual induced by 
delaying retirement changes (the “price” or “substitution” effect). 
 
Confirming most findings in the international literature, we find large effects of financial 
incentives on the preferred retirement age, often even larger than the effects found with 
revealed preferences, in line with the fact that we allow for flexible choices without imposing 
restrictions like mandatory retirement at age 65. Introducing gradual retirement opportunities 
after the normal retirement age would stimulate participation after age 65. We find that for 
trade-offs involving gradual retirement, the replacement rate after full retirement is given 
much more weight than the replacement rate during gradual retirement. Our simulations with 
choices between actuarially fair retirement scenarios at ages between 60 and 70 show that 
an increase in life-time pension incomes by 10% would lower the average retirement age by 
3 months (the income effect). Changing the compensation for delaying retirement from 
actuarially fair to 50% of what would be actuarially fair would reduce the average retirement 
age by 9.7 months. 1 Introduction
The population in many developed countries is ageing and individuals are living
longer, leading to a permanent change in the ratio between the numbers of econom-
ically active and inactive people. In the Netherlands, for example, expectations are
that without changes in pension and retirement policies, the ratio of the number of
people aged 65 and above to the economically active population would double in the
next 30 years, to over 40 %, see Kakes and Broeders (2006). Pension systems will
become unsustainable if they do not adjust to this demographic change, see, e.g.,
Capretta (2007).
One of the problematic features of many pension systems is the existence of
generous early retirement schemes which stimulate labour market exit long before
the normal retirement age and greatly add to the total cost of the system. See, e.g.,
Gruber and Wise (1998, 2004) for a summary of the evidence in many countries
and Kapteyn and De Vos (1998, 2004) for the Netherlands. In the Netherlands
and other countries, early retirement became common in the 1970's when the social
partners sought to \free up" jobs for younger workers facing a high unemployment
rate. In the 1990's the government and the social partners realized that the early
retirement programs imposed a prohibitive tax on continued work and a start was
made to gradually phase them out. A new system of \pre-pension" with fewer
employment disincentives was introduced. Pre-pension benets are, in contrast to
the old early retirement benets, adjusted according to the retirement age, with
lower benets for early retirees. In 2005 other steps to discourage people to retire
early were taken. The Dutch government passed legislation that will phase out
the tax-favoured treatment of all employer-based early retirement programs, see
Capretta (2007). As a consequence, the male labour force participation rate in the
age group 55-64 has risen from about 40 % in the 70's to around 60 % in 2006. For
women it rose from less than 20 % to around 40 %. Raising the eective retirement
age further is often seen as the most feasible way to improve sustainability of the
pension system.
Employment after the normal retirement age (usually 65) is very uncommon in
many European countries. In the Netherlands, a negligible percentage of employees
currently remain at work after age 65. Mandatory retirement is the default, although
in principle, rms can rehire workers after age 65, for example on a temporary and
part-time basis. Factors that potentially hamper late retirement are the fact that
not all pension funds allow for accumulating pension entitlements after age 65 and
the obligation to pay wages for two years after an employee becomes ill.
The more recent debate focuses on creating more exibility in order to optimize
3the use of the capabilities of older workers, accounting for heterogeneity in pref-
erences and productivity. See, for example, Belloni et al. (2006) for an overview
of policies towards exible retirement in European countries and Bovenberg and
Gradus (2008) for a discussion of proposed policy changes in the Netherlands. For
the supply side this means, for example, making the retirement age more exible
with rewards for workers who postpone retirement, in the form of actuarially fair
pension adjustments and tax arrangements that stimulate later retirement, and cre-
ating more opportunities for gradual retirement, see Kantarci and Van Soest (2008).
Working after age 65 is an explicit part of the new plans of the Dutch government.
For example, eligibility for the rst pillar pension (AOW) that provides the mini-
mum subsistence level currently starts at age 65 by default, but a new arrangement
makes it possible to delay receiving this in exchange for 5% higher benets for ev-
ery year of delaying. Moreover, the government has launched new plans to delay
eligibility to age 67 for everyone.
In order to design successful reforms of retirement policy, it is important to
design nancially sustainable retirement plans that are attractive for workers. The
current paper aims at analyzing workers' preferences for potential retirement plans,
with emphasis on plans that allow for full-time or part-time work after age 65.
In the economic literature, there are many empirical models explaining labour
supply behaviour of older workers in an inter-temporal framework. They usually use
data on observed actual behaviour of the individuals, i.e. revealed preference (RP)
data (see, e.g., Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) for an overview and Kapteyn and
De Vos (2004), Heyma (2004), Euwals et al. (2007) or Mastrogiacomo et al. (2004) for
applications to the Netherlands). In general, revealed preference data capture actual
choices made by individuals and are well suited to short-term forecasting of the
eects of small departures from the current state of aairs. To study preferences of
people in settings which dier a lot from the current state, it is generally better to use
stated preference (SP) data relying on the choices of people in hypothetical situations
described in survey questions. This method is commonly used in marketing research
and transport economics (see, e.g., Louviere et al. (2002)) and is gaining ground in
economics (e.g., Barsky et al. (1997) or Revelt and Train (1998)). Respondents
are provided with information on hypothetical (but potentially realistic) retirement
scenarios and are asked to state their choice between several scenarios, to rank the
scenarios, or to rate each of the scenarios.1
In our analysis we use stated preference data to analyze preferences of Dutch
1See Van Soest et al. (2006) for more discussion on the advantages and potential disadvantages
of SP and RP data on retirement preferences.
4people for early, late and gradual retirement. The main reason for using stated
rather than revealed preferences is that we want to estimate preferences for pension
plans which do not exist or to which many workers do not have access, such as
retirement after age 65 or gradual retirement. Moreover, stated preference data allow
for a design where choice opportunities are exactly known and variation in choices is
substantial and by construction exogenous to preferences. Stated preference data on
retirement of Dutch workers have been collected and analyzed by Nelissen (2001),
Bruinshoofd and Grob (2005), Van Soest et al. (2006) and Fouarge et al. (2008).
Compared to these earlier studies, we use richer (and more recent) data from various
years and focus on estimating a exible structural model that can be used to compute
income and substitution eects on retirement decisions.
Specically, survey respondents of ages 25 and older in the CentER panel (a
representative sample of the Dutch adult population) were given hypothetical re-
tirement scenarios describing the age(s) of (partial and full) retirement and corre-
sponding replacement rates. Several types of retirement trajectories were considered
{ three trajectories without gradual retirement and with retirement ages 65 (stan-
dard retirement age), 67 (late retirement), and 63 (early retirement) and a partial
retirement trajectory. Retirement trajectories were evaluated in both rating and
choice questions. The data were collected in 2006, 2007 and 2008, partly for the
same respondents (leading to an unbalanced panel).
We use the SP data to estimate an intertemporal utility model in which the
individual's utility is the discounted sum of within period utilities that depend on
employment status (working, partially retired, or (fully) retired) and income in that
period. Parameters of the utility function are allowed to depend on observed and
unobserved respondent characteristics and on the year of data collection. The esti-
mated model is then used to analyze how retirement preferences dier by background
characteristics such as sex, age, and education and how they evolve over the survey
years. Simulating the choice of the retirement age under actuarially fair and un-
fair trade-os, we then analyze how the preferred retirement age changes if pension
income levels change irrespective of the retirement age (the \(pension) income ef-
fect"), or if the pension benet accrual induced by delaying retirement changes (the
\price" or \substitution" eect).
Conrming most ndings in the international literature, we nd large eects of
nancial incentives on the preferred retirement age. The eects we nd are often
larger still than the eects found with revealed preferences, which is in line with the
fact that we allow for exible choices without imposing restrictions like mandatory
retirement at age 65. According to our simulations of a choice among actuarially fair
5retirement scenarios at all ages between 60 and 70, an increase in life-time pension
incomes by 10% would lower the average retirement age by 3 months (the \income
eect"). Changing the compensation for delaying retirement from actuarially fair
to 50% of what would be actuarially fair would reduce the average retirement age
by 9.7 months (the \substitution eect").
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the questions and the
data on stated retirement preferences. Section 3 introduces the model, describes
the estimation procedure, and presents the parameter estimates. Section 4 presents
the results of simulations and the implied estimates of the income and substitution
eects. Section 5 presents some sensitivity checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Stated Preference Questions
The questionnaires were included in the Dutch CentERpanel, administrated by Cen-
tERdata at Tilburg University. The CentERpanel covers the population in the
Netherlands of ages 16 and older. It is composed of over 2000 households in which
one or more adults complete questionnaires at home every week through the Inter-
net. The CentERpanel is not restricted to households with prior access to Internet:
households without access are provided with access by CentERdata and are given
a set-top box that can be connected to their television set and phone line if they
do not have a personal computer. (And households without a television set are also
given a portable TV.) About 75% of all panel members respond to the questions in
a given weekend.
The Netspar questionnaire about retirement preferences was elded in June 2006,
June 2007 and June 2008. In each wave respondents were asked to evaluate hypo-
thetical and stylized retirement trajectories, designed to be similar to the choices
people potentially face, so that they are perceived as realistic. On the other hand,
many of the retirement scenarios are currently not oered by all employers, and in
order to make sure we measure individual preferences and not demand side con-
straints, respondents are explicitly asked to assume that their employer will oer
each scenario.
To describe a hypothetical situation, respondents rst received an introductory
text. Respondents younger than 60 were asked to assume that they would still work
when turning 60, that their job at 60 would be similar to their current job and
that their employer would fully cooperate with any trajectory. Respondents of age
60 and older got similar instructions with adjusted wording and were asked about
the job they had just before turning 60. Before the scenario questions were asked,
6respondents rst reported their number of working hours per week (WH), which was
then used to formulate the hypothetical retirement scenarios. Respondents younger
than 60 were specically asked how many hours per week they currently worked,
while respondents of age 60 and older were asked how many hours per week they
worked for pay just before they turned 60.
Since the trajectories are based on the number of paid working hours WHbefore
retirement and their reduction during gradual and full retirement, it makes little
sense to interview people younger than 60 who work zero hours or people older
than 60 who worked zero hours at the time they turned 60. Furthermore, some
respondents report that they have paid work but also that they have no income. To
avoid these problems people who work (or worked when turning 60) for pay less than
3.5 hours per week or whose monthly net income is (or was) less than 45 Euro were
not given the scenario questions. Moreover, the questions were not administered to
panel members younger than 25, mainly since we thought they probably had not
thought much about pensions yet.
This selection leads to a sample in which men and people with high income and
high education are overrepresented. The age of respondents is between 25 and 93
years, with medium age of 51 years. The composition of the sample is given in
Table 1. In total 2978 observations on 1605 respondents are available. 429 people
are interviewed in all three waves, 515 people in two waves and 661 people are
interviewed just once.
Respondents got four scenarios describing standard, late, early and partial re-
tirement plans. The scenarios for waves 2006 and 2007 were the following:
Trajectory 1 - standard retirement
WHtill age 65, full retirement at age 65. Disposable pension income is [60%=65%=70%]
of last net earnings.
Trajectory 2 - late retirement
WHtill age 68, full retirement at age 68. Disposable pension income is [80%=85%=90%]
of last net earnings.
Trajectory 3 - early retirement
WHtill age 62, full retirement at age 62. Disposable pension income is [45%=50%=55%]
of last net earnings.
Trajectory 4 - gradual retirement
WHtill age [60=62=64], reduced working time to 60 % of WHfrom age [60=62=64]
till age [63=65=67], full retirement at age [63=65=67]. Disposable labour income from
7[60=62=64] till [63=65=67] is [70%=75%=80%] of earnings at age [60=62=64]; pension
income after age [63=65=67] (incl. AOW) is [60%=65%=70%] of net earnings at age
[60=62=64].








education low (basis, VMBO) 26.9
education medium (HAVO, VWO, MBO) 31.2
education high (HBO, WO) 41.9
partner 75.3
income low (net inc 1000-) 15.6
income medium (net inc 1001-2000) 55.7
income high (net inc 2001+) 28.7
work hours 15- 7.1
work hours 16-32 25.1
work hours 33+ 67.8
own house 75.0
wave 1 - year 2006 34.7
wave 2 - year 2007 37.4
wave 3 - year 2008 27.9
Note: 2978 observations; 429 respondents participated in all three waves, 515 in two waves,
and 661 in one wave.
In each wave respondents were randomly allocated into three groups. Based on
this, in all trajectories they were oered one of the three replacement rates given in
brackets.2 In the partial retirement trajectory, ages for partial and full retirement
were also varied across the three groups.3 In the 2008 wave, somewhat dierent
trajectories were used, with dierent replacement rates and a small change in the
2The replacement rates are low compared to replacement rates of actual retirees (see Fouarge
et al. (2008)) but are reasonably representative of subjective expectations of future replacement
rates of current employees. For example, Van Dalen et al. (2008) report an average expected
replacement rate of 67%.
3The order in which the trajectories were presented to the respondents was also randomized.
8age of gradual retirement. This was done in order to increase the variation across
trajectories and to improve the eciency of the estimator. The evaluated trajectories
in all waves are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Description of Pension Trajectories in SP Questions
waves 1,2 wave 3
trajectory g1 g2 g3 g1 g2 g3
1 - standard age full 65 65 65 65 65 65
rr full 60 65 70 65 70 75
2 - late age full 68 68 68 68 68 68
rr full 80 85 90 75 85 95
3 - early age full 62 62 62 62 62 62
rr full 45 50 55 50 50 50
4 - partial age part 60 62 64 61 61 64
age full 63 65 67 65 65 68
rr part 70 75 80 100 75 85
rr full 60 65 70 60 70 80
Note: In each wave, people were randomly assigned to one of three groups g1, g2 or g3,
with dierent replacement rates. Each respondent evaluated four trajectories dened by
partial retirement age (age part), replacement rate in partial retirement (rr part), full
retirement age (age full) and replacement rate in full retirement period (rr full).
Respondents evaluated the hypothetical trajectories of standard, late, early and
partial retirement by rating each trajectory and by choosing between pairs of trajec-
tories. In the four rating questions the attractiveness of each retirement trajectory
was assessed on a ten point scale from 1 (very unattractive) to 10 (very attractive).
The answers will be denoted by R1, R2, R3 and R4 for the four scenarios of bench-
mark, late, early and gradual retirement, respectively. In the two choice questions
respondents were asked to choose between two trajectories { standard and late re-
tirement (trajectories 1 and 2) and standard and gradual retirement (trajectories 1
and 4). The reported choices are denoted by C1 and C2, respectively.
In Figure 1, histograms of the evaluations of the standard retirement trajectory
(R1) and their comparisions with the evaluations of late retirement trajectory (R1-
R2), early retirement trajectory (R1-R3) and gradual retirement trajectory (R1-R4)
are given for the year 2006 and the randomization group of respondents g3 in Table
2.4 In Table 3, means and standard errors of evaluations of the four retirement
4Looking at the dierences instead of the levels eliminates response scale dierences between
9Figure 1: Histograms of the evaluations of the standard retirement trajectory
(benchmark) and their comparison with the evaluations of late, early and partial
retirement trajectories for wave 1, group 3.

























































































(d) benchmark - partial retirement
10trajectories (R1, R2, R3 and R4) as well as of the choices (C1 and C2) are presented,
separately for each wave and for each of the three random assignment groups. The
mean of the benchmark evaluations in Figure 1(a) is 5.27 (see Table 3), with quite
large dispersion. Possible reasons for this may be genuine heterogeneity in how
attractive this specic scenario is to dierent respondents, the fact that dierent
respondents may have dierent response scales, or noise in the assessments.
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Ratings and Choices
wave 1 wave 2 wave 3 waves
all g1 g2 g3 all g1 g2 g3 all g1 g2 g3 all
R1 mean 4.09 3.65 3.41 5.27 3.90 3.36 3.38 4.99 4.75 3.91 5.24 5.12 4.20
s.d. 2.34 2.09 2.08 2.40 2.35 2.13 2.12 2.44 2.45 2.27 2.41 2.45 2.40
R2 mean 4.21 4.19 3.90 4.56 3.82 3.69 3.72 4.07 4.12 3.73 4.17 4.47 4.04
s.d. 2.78 2.69 2.71 2.90 2.60 2.50 2.57 2.71 2.75 2.59 2.69 2.91 2.71
R3 mean 3.12 2.93 3.15 3.29 2.98 2.86 2.91 3.18 3.43 3.48 3.43 3.39 3.16
s.d. 2.01 1.95 2.07 2.00 1.98 2.00 1.92 2.02 2.20 2.36 2.10 2.13 2.06
R4 mean 4.69 4.71 4.49 4.89 4.40 4.47 4.35 4.38 4.81 4.60 5.54 4.34 4.61
s.d. 2.26 2.13 2.24 2.41 2.30 2.28 2.14 2.46 2.50 2.43 2.20 2.68 2.35
C1 mean 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.65 0.70 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.72
s.d. 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.45
C2 mean 0.34 0.23 0.21 0.58 0.35 0.20 0.23 0.62 0.45 0.37 0.32 0.66 0.37
s.d. 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.48 0.40 0.42 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48
Note: choices C1 and C2 coded as 1 if benchmark trajectory (R1) is chosen; 0 otherwise.
The histogram in Figure 1(b) shows that the benchmark is preferred to late
retirement more often than the other way around. This corresponds to the fact
that in the choice question C1 (standard versus late retirement trajectory), 73 % of
people choose the standard retirement trajectory (see Table 3). Figure 1(c), where
the benchmark is compared to the early retirement scenario, shows that most people
give lower ratings to early retirement than to the benchmark. On the other hand, the
symmetric distribution of dierences R1-R4 (benchmark minus gradual retirement)
in Figure 1(d) shows that the group preferring the benchmark to gradual retirement
is about as large as the group with the opposite preference. In the choice question C2
(standard versus gradual retirement), 58 % of people chose the standard retirement
trajectory (see Table 3).
respondents (cf. Van Soest et al. 2006).
11There are some statistically signicant changes in the average ratings between
2006 and 2007; in particular, many of the mean ratings in 2007 are lower than the
corresponding means in 2006, suggesting that respondent evaluations have become
more negative. Where comparable,5 the means in 2008 are not signicantly dierent
from those in 2006, but there are some signicant dierences between 2008 and
2007.6
Comparing the mean evaluations of the three groups in a given year for a given
question R1, R2 or R3 shows how the evaluations vary with the replacement rate.
Group g1 got the lowest and group g3 the highest replacement rate, except for R3
in 2008, where the replacement rate for all groups was 50 % (see Table 2). The
evaluation of a retirement scenario with a higher replacement rate is either signi-
cantly higher or not statistically dierent from that of the same retirement scenario
with a lower replacement rate. The biggest dierence between the groups is found
for question R1 (standard retirement trajectory), where trajectories with replace-
ment rates lower than 70 % are evaluated signicantly less than the trajectories with
replacement rates 70 %. This can be due to the general preference for defaults -
the default retirement age in the Netherlands is 65 with an accompanying pension
income equal approximately to 70 % of the last earned wage.
Gradual retirement trajectories dier in the replacement rate during partial re-
tirement as well as after full retirement, but also in the age of partial retirement
and the age of full retirement. This makes it impossible to directly interpret the
dierences in evaluations of R4 across groups and years. In order to understand
what these evaluations imply, we will use the structural model introduced in the
next section.
Table 4 compares responses to rating and choice questions of the same respon-
dents in the same wave. Respondents who prefer the standard retirement trajectory
to the late retirement trajectory in the choice question (C1=1) also tend to evaluate
the standard retirement trajectory higher than the late retirement trajectory in the
rating questions (R1>R2). Specically, 47:4 % of the C1=1 respondents rate the
standard retirement trajectory higher, 34:6 % give the same ratings for both trajec-
tories and 18:1 % rate the standard retirement trajectory lower than late retirement.
For C1=1 respondents, the mean ratings of the standard and late retirement trajec-
tories are 4.12 and 3.26, resp. Of the other respondents who chose the late retirement
trajectory over standard retirement (C1=0), 13:4 % rated the late retirement tra-
5for example for question R1, group g3 in 2006 got the same replacement rates as group g2 in
2008; see Table 2
6P-values lower than 0.05 are obtained for R2 { group g2 in 2007 and group g3 in 2008 { and
for R3 group g2 in 2007 and any of the groups in 2008.
12jectory lower than the standard retirement trajectory (R1>R2). The other C1=0
respondents either gave a higher rating to the late retirement trajectory (65:5 %)
or rated the two trajectories equally (21:1 %). The mean evaluation of the late
retirement trajectory (mean R2 = 6.01) by C1=0 respondents is signicantly higher
than their mean evaluation of the standard retirement trajectory (mean R1 = 4.41).
Table 4: Ratings and Choices
percentage mean
R1>R2 R1=R2 R1<R2 R1 R2
C1=1 47.39 34.56 18.05 4.12 3.26
C1=0 13.40 21.12 65.48 4.41 6.01
R1>R4 R1=R4 R1<R4 R1 R4
C2=1 44.37 34.02 21.60 4.69 3.87
C2=0 16.03 25.07 58.90 3.91 5.06
Note: In the rst choice question respondents could choose the standard retirement tra-
jectory (C1=1) or the late retirement trajectory (C1=0). For each of these two choices the
table shows how often the rating of the standard retirement trajectory was higher than the
late retirement trajectory (R1>R2), the same (R1=R2), or lower (R1<R2). Similarly, in
the second choice question respondents chose between the standard retirement trajectory
(C2=1) and the gradual retirement trajectory (C2=0) and the table shows how the ratings
(R1 and R4) compared to the choice.
In the second choice question C2, respondents could choose between standard
and gradual retirement. Again, on average, the choices are in line with the ratings
(see Table 4) but there are also many inconsistencies. For example, 78:4 % of
the respondents who prefer the benchmark trajectory to the gradual retirement
trajectory (C2=1) rate the standard retirement trajectory higher (R1<R4) or in
the same way (R1=R4), while for 21:6 % the ratings are inconsistent with the
choice. The inconsistencies may be due to reporting errors in both choice and rating
questions, and Table 4 makes clear that it is important to account for these errors
in the structural model.
133 Model of Stated Retirement Preferences
We use a life-cycle model similar but more general than the one of Van Soest et al.
(2006). We assume that the total utility of retirement trajectory q for individual
i = 1;:::;I in wave s = 1;2;3, U
q












ist is the utility at age t = 60;:::;100 and  is the discount factor. The
time horizon is xed at 100 years of age and thus each work { retirement trajectory
covers ages from 60 (the earliest retirement age in the scenarios) to 100.
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c) c = 0;p;r;y (5)

c
i ? Xis c = 0;p;r;y (6)
Here P and R are dummies for partial and full retirement, respectively, and ?
denotes statistical independence. At each age t, a person can be not retired (P =
R = 0) and working pre-retirement hours (WH), partially retired (P = 1, R = 0)
and working 60% of pre-retirement hours, or fully retired (P = 0, R = 1). yt
denotes logarithm of the replacement rate, that is the log of net (pension and/or
labour) income at age t as a fraction of pre-retirement net earnings. For example,
if after tax pension income during full retirement is 70% of pre-retirement after tax
earnings then y = log(0:7) at that age. Note that the replacement rates vary by
design of each scenario, independent of individual characteristics. Before (gradual)
retirement, we have y = log(1) = 0.
As apparent from equation(4), 
p
ist is the preference parameter for partial retire-
ment, determining the utility of partial retirement compared to the utility of not
retired at age t for respondent i in wave s. The parameter is assumed to depend on
a set of observed characteristics Xis at the time of survey s, like gender, age, and
education. Moreover, 
p
ist can depend on unobserved characteristics of person i, 
p
i ,
assumed to be normally distributed with expected value 0 and standard deviation
p, independent of observed characteristics Xis. Wave eects are captured by the
parameters s and the eects of age t in each period considered by 
p
t.
14The preference parameter r
ist for full retirement has the same specication as

p
ist. We expect that the parameters p and r will be positive because people's
valuation of retirement increases with age, due to e.g. deteriorating health.
The coecient 
y
is determines the inuence of an income change in full retire-
ment. It is assumed to depend on the observed characteristics Xis, an unobserved
heterogeneity term y and a survey wave eect s. Thus 
y
is is not allowed to vary
with age t. The reason is that, with the given design, there would be a high negative
correlation between tRt and tyt preventing estimation of both coecients. To solve
this problem more variation in the replacement rates in the scenarios would have
been needed, but this would also involve the drawback of making the scenarios less
realistic.
The inuence of an income change in partial retirement on utility is captured by

y
is + py. The parameter py reects the dierence between the eects of income
on utility in periods of partial and full retirement. Note that y
q
ist when not retired
is always equal to log(1) = 0, which is why no second interaction term (between
log(y) and R) could be included.
The coecient 0
is determines the level of utility regardless of labour force status
and income. When comparing utility of two trajectories, this coecient does not
play any role. It depends on observed and unobserved characteristics of the individ-
ual and may vary across the three waves of the survey, but it does not depend on
age { age eects on 0
is would not be identied (because we always consider the age
range 60 { 100).
As described in section 2, the respondents rated four pension trajectories on a
discrete scale from 1 to 10. The observed ratings R
q








is q =1;2;3;4 (7)
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q
is = k , k 1 < V
q











i c =0;p;r;y (10)
1 is the \reporting error" in the rating questions. Threshold parameters  1 =
0 < 1 < :::9 < 10 = 1 are assumed to be the same for all respondents. For
identication, 1 is set to 1:5 and 9 to 9:5.
In the choice questions respondents choose between the standard retirement tra-
jectory and late retirement (C1) or partial retirement (C2). An observed choice of
the standard retirement trajectory is coded by 1, a choice of the alternative is coded
15by 0. Observed choices C1
is and C2
is are modelled as follows:
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is =0 otherwise (11)
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is c =0;p;r;y (14)
The optimization errors in choice questions q = 1;2 are denoted as 2q. Their
variance can be dierent from that of 1
is because noise levels in ratings and choices
may well dier (see Louviere et al. (2002)).
3.1 Estimation
The estimation of our model is similar to the estimation of a mixed logit model
and other random coecient models (cf., e.g., Revelt and Train (1998)). These
models are usually estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. The likelihood
contribution for individual i conditional on unobserved heterogeneity parameters






i )0 can be written as a product of the probabilities of the observed
outcomes R
q
is;q = 1;:::;4 and C
q
is;q = 1;2, the answers to the ratings and choice
questions of respondent i in all waves s = 1;2;3.7 Model assumptions in 7 and 11
imply that these probabilities can be written as follows:
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s;b; c = 0;p;r;y; b = p;r; t = 0;:::;40g
is the set of all relevant individual and trajectory characteristics and parameters and
 is the standard normal distribution function.
The (unconditional) likelihood contribution for individual i can be written as
7In case of item non-response (if a respondent answers \don't know" or \refuse" to a specic
question) or unit nonresponse (if a respondent does not participate in a given survey wave) the
corresponding probability is replaced by 1. (We work with the full unbalanced panel.)









is j Ais;~ i)f(~ i)d~ i; (18)
where f denotes the density of the vector of random coecients. The assumption







Since it is not feasible to compute the integral numerically we approximate the
integral using simulated values of the random coecients and use simulated maxi-















is j Ais; ~ 
c
i;sim; c = 0;p;r;y

; (20)
where Sim is the number of simulations and ~ c
i;sim is a random draw from a normal
distribution with mean zero and standard deviation c. Usually a large number
of pseudo-random draws is needed to assure a reasonably low simulation error in
the estimated parameters. The number of draws and thus the time the estimation
procedure takes can be substantially reduced (keeping the same simulation variance)
by using quasi-random numbers of Halton sequence (see Train (2003)). The number
of draws per individual is 500.8
Estimates of the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates are based upon the
asymptotic result from Gourieroux and Monfort (1991). One of the key assumptions
is that
p
N=Sim ! 0 if N;Sim ! 1, where N is number of observations and Sim
number of simulations for each respondent (see, e.g., Gourieroux and Monfort (1996)
for details on simulated maximum likelihood).
3.2 Estimation Results
Parameter estimates are presented in Table 5. The rst column (\0") presents
the coecients 0, which determine 0, the utility in year t of the pre-retirement
benchmark status (y = 0, D = 0, P = 0). Since the other parameters drive the
change in utility due to a deviation from this benchmark, 0 aects the ratings of
the scenarios but not the choices. Many of the parameters in 0 are signicant,
8Estimated coecients using Sim = 600 or Sim = 700; were virtually identical to those with
Sim = 500. For the four random coecients we use Halton sequences with primes 3;5;7 and 11.
17implying substantial heterogeneity in the (absolute) utility ratings. For example,
the age groups 45-64 give less positive utility ratings than the younger and older age
groups, and the lower income groups give more positive ratings than the middle and
high income groups. Respondents with a small part-time job are more positive than
those who work(ed) longer hours. Note that this may not be a causal eect { it may
be due to common preference factors that drive both current working hours and
desired future working hours. The same remark applies to all included employment
status variables.
The large and signicant estimate of 0 implies that there is also substantial
heterogeneity that is not captured by the observed respondent characteristics. The
signicant estimates of 2 and 3 imply that utility ratings in 2007 and 2008 were
less and more positive than those in 2006, respectively. These time eects might
reect, for example, temporary eects due to the political debate at the time of the
survey.
Parameters p and r in the second column (\p") and third column (\r") de-
termine how the dierences in utility between partial retirement and pre-retirement
(p) and between full retirement and pre-retirement r) vary with respondent char-
acteristics. We do not nd a signicant eect of gender, education, home ownership
or partnership status. The utility of partial retirement is signicantly lower for the
older birth cohorts, while no signicant cohort eect on the utility of full retirement
is found. Keeping the other variables constant, the higher income respondents at-
tach higher utility to working part-time or not working at all, reecting a life-time
income eect if leisure is a normal good. Part-time workers have the largest prefer-
ence for partial as well as full retirement. Full-time workers value partial retirement
more than non-workers but less than part-timers.
The parameters p
s and r
s indicate how the evaluations of partial and full retire-
ment vary with the time of data collection. The utility of part-time work (compared
to the utility of full-time work) is signicantly lower in 2008 than in 2006 or 2007,
suggesting that preferences for partial retirement have decreased.
The signicant estimate of r implies that respondents attach increasing utility
to full retirement when they get older. This may reect that expected health dete-
rioration at older ages is seen as an impediment to full-time work. The small and
insignicant estimate of p implies that such an impediment much less applies to
part-time work and suggests that partial retirement might make it easier to keep
people with a health concern in the labour market.
18Table 5: Estimation Results
0 p r y
Coe. T-val. Coe. T-val. Coe. T-val. Coe. T-val.
const -0.471 -4.777 0.039 0.558 -0.771 -4.552 0.470 2.936
male 0.018 0.619 0.020 0.680 -0.027 -0.340 0.085 1.022
age 45-54 -0.149 -5.070 -0.006 -0.209 0.121 1.518 -0.085 -1.056
age 55-64 -0.100 -3.141 -0.054 -1.694 0.018 0.207 -0.176 -1.994
age 65+ 0.091 2.895 -0.063 -2.046 -0.051 -0.616 0.102 1.172
education mid -0.020 -0.668 0.011 0.381 0.041 0.517 0.023 0.279
education high 0.029 0.964 0.043 1.489 0.056 0.711 0.118 1.429
partner -0.057 -2.071 0.024 0.905 0.056 0.762 -0.033 -0.440
income mid -0.102 -2.755 0.066 1.747 0.111 1.085 0.077 0.734
income high -0.130 -2.918 0.094 2.047 0.187 1.510 0.141 1.104
work hours 16-32 -0.135 -2.827 0.175 3.477 0.286 2.125 0.232 1.671
work hours 33+ -0.105 -2.056 0.131 2.468 0.163 1.139 0.105 0.712
own house -0.047 -1.750 -0.017 -0.631 0.012 0.160 -0.065 -0.865
 (s.d. of ) 0.198 20.643 0.168 11.387 0.001 0.096 0.357 15.384
2 -0.084 -3.436 0.024 0.853 0.130 1.781 0.107 1.494
3 0.059 2.040 -0.154 -4.002 -0.099 -1.133 -0.077 -0.871

















Although we have included many observed characteristics of respondents, we
still nd signicant unobserved heterogeneity in p. On the other hand, unobserved
heterogeneity in r is virtually zero (and insignicant).
The last column indicates the eect of the log replacement rate during full or
19partial retirement. A larger replacement rate is valued signicantly less by the age
cohort 55   64 than by the youngest and oldest age cohort. The eects of other
respondent characteristics are not signicant at the 5% level. Still, the large and
signicant estimate of the unobserved heterogeneity parameter y shows that there
is substantial dispersion in how respondents value a higher replacement rate.
The negative estimate of py implies that the utility from an increase in income
is signicantly lower during partial retirement than during full retirement. The
estimated value of the discount factor  is equal to 0:89 and it is very accurately
determined with a standard error of only 0:005. This also captures the mortality
rate since mortality is not explicitly taken into account.
Finally, the estimated standard deviations of the error terms imply that the
amount of noise is much larger in the ratings than in the choices: the estimate of 1
is more than three times larger than that of 2. For a given level of noise, ratings of
a set of scenarios would provide more information than only the choice among these
scenarios, but this dierence is counteracted by the dierence in noise levels.
4 Simulations
In this section, we discuss the implications of the model estimates. We rst discuss
how the preferences for early and late full and gradual retirement vary with back-
ground characteristics. Then we show how people respond to a change in pension
income in partial and full retirement. We also simulate choices among actuarially
neutral trajectories with retirement age varying from 60 to 70. Finally, we analyze
the (pension) income and substitution eects on the preferred age of retirement.
The simulations are all based on the estimated parameters in Table 5 of the previ-
ous section.
4.1 Comparing to the Benchmark
Simulated probabilities presented in Tables 6 and 7 are computed in the following
way. For each respondent i in each year s, we rst compute the probability of
choosing the alternative scenario if the choice is between this alternative and the
benchmark scenario (retirement at age 65, replacement rate 70%) only. This proba-
bility takes into account observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity and the
optimization error in the choice questions (2). These probabilities are averaged
over the sub-samples of respondents with observed characteristics as indicated in
the tables. For example, the number 1.36 in the rst row (\Late 1") and eighth
20column of Table 6 indicates that the probability that a person of age 55-64 chooses
the Late 1 trajectory rather than the benchmark retirement trajectory is 1:36 %.
The scenarios are dened in columns 2{5 of the table; they are taken from Van
Soest et al. (2006). The rst six { Late 1 to Early 3 { do not involve gradual retire-
ment. Scenarios Late 1, Late 2 and Late 3 describe late retirement at age 70 with
net pension incomes equal to 90 %, 100 % and 110 % of net pre-retirement earnings,
respectively. Simulated probabilities show that most people prefer the benchmark
to these late retirement trajectories. In particular, only 3 % of the people would
prefer postponed retirement with a replacement rate of 90 % to benchmark. With
increasing replacement rates, the number of people choosing postponed retirement
increases, but even with a replacement rate of 110% (a compensation for late re-
tirement that is more than actuarially fair), only 11% of all respondents would opt
for late retirement.9 The nal three columns give the choice probabilities by age
group. Particularly in the age groups 45-64 very few respondents would choose late
retirement.
Scenarios, Early 1, 2 and 3 describe early retirement at age 62 with replacement
rates equal to 50, 60 and 70 % of net pre-retirement earnings. Scenario Early 1 is
preferred to the benchmark by 13 % of the respondents. An increase in the replace-
ment rate substantially increases the attractiveness of early retirement: scenario
Early 2 with replacement rate 60 % is already preferred to the benchmark by more
than a quarter of the respondents, and scenario Early 3 with replacement rate 70 %
is preferred to the benchmark scenario by 57 % of all respondents. The annual in-
comes in this scenario dier from those of the benchmark scenario only during the
period from age 62 to age 65. The utility of being fully retired compared to being
at work at these ages compensates the decrease in utility due to the lower income
during early retirement. Particularly in the age group 45-64, many respondents
would be willing to pay this rather low (and actuarially less than fair) price for early
retirement.
9The benchmark with retirement age 65 and replacement rate 70 % is actuarially equivalent to
late retirement at age 70 and replacement rate 103 %; see also Table 7 and its discussion.
21Table 6: Probabilities of Choosing Described Trajectory rather than Benchmark
Retirement trajectory Probability (in %)
age part rr part age full rr full all age 44- age 45-54 age 55-64 age 65+
Late 1 70 90 3.01 3.10 1.01 1.36 7.04
Late 2 70 100 6.44 6.85 2.60 3.13 13.85
Late 3 70 110 10.92 11.87 5.13 5.70 21.77
Early 1 62 50 12.75 9.58 18.44 19.36 4.45
Early 2 62 60 25.14 20.84 35.65 33.23 11.22
Early 3 62 70 56.96 53.99 70.20 62.36 40.04
Partial 1 63 85 67 70 50.46 55.26 46.83 46.83 50.43
Partial 2 63 100 67 70 53.44 58.87 48.74 47.03 56.42
Partial 3 63 85 67 80 68.54 73.53 64.08 61.96 72.15
Late partial 1 65 90 70 90 17.05 20.85 10.04 10.41 25.96
Late partial 2 65 100 70 100 27.44 32.60 18.11 17.40 40.33
Early partial 60 75 65 60 60.79 62.71 66.17 65.55 46.05
male female education education education partner no house house
law mid high partner rented own
Late 1 3.43 2.30 3.42 2.51 3.13 2.59 4.30 4.51 2.52
Late 2 7.29 4.96 6.77 5.43 6.97 5.67 8.78 9.14 5.54
Late 3 12.26 8.59 10.93 9.36 12.08 9.80 14.34 14.84 9.62
Early 1 11.19 15.47 14.80 14.33 10.26 13.77 9.64 9.07 13.98
Early 2 23.06 28.76 25.73 27.21 23.21 26.83 19.99 19.16 27.12
Early 3 55.44 59.62 52.61 58.28 58.78 59.02 50.70 49.72 59.37
Partial 1 52.26 47.30 48.80 49.42 52.29 50.17 51.31 53.04 49.59
Partial 2 55.83 49.26 50.19 51.63 56.87 52.88 55.14 56.96 52.26
Partial 3 70.91 64.40 65.14 66.75 72.05 67.96 70.29 71.92 67.41
Late partial 1 19.11 13.45 15.85 15.12 19.25 15.90 20.53 21.90 15.43
Late partial 2 30.36 22.35 24.68 24.50 31.39 25.90 32.13 33.79 25.32
Early partial 60.51 61.28 60.22 62.08 60.21 62.11 56.79 57.79 61.79
income income income work hrs work hrs work hrs wave 1 wave 2 wave 3
low mid high 15- 16-32 33+
Late 1 3.50 2.89 2.98 3.81 1.80 3.38 3.19 2.06 4.08
Late 2 6.62 6.21 6.78 6.67 4.41 7.17 6.73 5.11 7.87
Late 3 10.44 10.58 11.85 9.99 8.20 12.03 11.27 9.49 12.42
Early 1 16.19 12.88 10.62 19.00 14.09 11.60 12.79 12.21 13.43
Early 2 25.59 25.60 23.98 24.92 29.99 23.36 24.31 27.75 22.67
Early 3 48.60 57.64 60.20 39.92 66.91 55.05 54.52 66.46 47.28
Partial 1 45.01 51.63 51.13 40.36 48.41 52.26 56.21 51.69 41.66
Partial 2 45.11 54.52 55.87 37.88 52.17 55.52 58.59 56.42 43.03
Partial 3 59.88 69.55 71.29 52.01 67.71 70.57 73.01 71.82 58.58
Late partial 1 13.75 17.32 18.31 11.04 13.86 18.85 20.22 16.61 13.69
Late partial 2 21.20 27.63 30.46 16.23 24.23 29.79 30.64 28.47 22.08
Early partial 57.31 62.47 59.42 53.82 62.30 60.96 66.29 63.31 50.58
22The last six scenarios, Partial 1 to Early partial, involve gradual retirement.
Partial 1, 2 and 3 have partial retirement at age 63 and full retirement at age
67, with three dierent replacement rates. On average, respondents appear to be
indierent between Partial 1 and the benchmark. An increase in the replacement
rate during partial retirement (Partial 2, by 15%-points) or full retirement (Partial
3, by 10%-points) makes gradual retirement more attractive, but the eect is much
stronger in the latter case. This is mainly a consequence of the negative estimate of
py which reduces the importance of the replacement rate during partial retirement
compared to that during full retirement.
In scenarios Late partial 1 and 2, the partial retirement age is 65 and the full
retirement age is 70 { the same age as in Late 1, 2 and 3. Scenario Late partial
1 oers a 20%  points higher replacement rate than the benchmark in return for
working 60 % of the pre-retirement working week for ve years. This scenario is
found more attractive than the benchmark scenario by 17 % of the sample, mainly
in the youngest and oldest age cohorts. Late partial 2 increases the replacement
rates by 10%-points compared to Late partial 1. Accordingly, the fraction of people
preferring this scenario to the benchmark rises to 27 %. These fractions are much
higher than the fractions preferring to work until age 70 without gradual retirement.
Almost no-one wants to work their full pre-retirement hours till age 70, but many
more people are willing to work a reduced number of hours until this age.
Finally, the scenario Early partial oers partial retirement at age 60 and full
retirement at age 65. About 60 % of the respondents prefer this to the benchmark,
although the corresponding pension income is lower than what would be actuarially
fair. For many respondents, the early partial retirement scenario is apparently also
more attractive than scenario Early 2, which gives the same replacement rate after
age 65 but has immediate full retirement at age 62. This shows that early and late
gradual retirement may be attractive alternatives for early and late full retirement.
Early gradual retirement is particularly attractive for the age group 54-64, while the
youngest and oldest age groups often prefer late gradual retirement.
The results for the complete sample can be compared with those of Van Soest
et al. (2006, Table 9, nal column)10 who used a similar methodology with older
data and a less exible model. Most results are qualitatively similar though we nd
a smaller tendency to choose the gradual retirement scenarios. Moreover, we nd
an even smaller eect of increasing the replacement rate during partial retirement,
10Since Van Soest et al. (2006) cannot estimate the noise level in choice questions, they use
either the noise level in ratings or noise level zero in their simulations. Our results are better
comparable to the latter case (nal column in their Table 9), since our estimates imply that the
noise level in choices is much smaller than in ratings.
23in line with our negative estimate of py.
In the second and third panel of Table 6, we present simulated choice probabili-
ties for various subsamples of respondents characterized by background characteris-
tics other than age. The dierences between groups are generally smaller than the
dierences between age groups in the top panel. Women have somewhat lower pref-
erences for late retirement trajectories and higher preferences for early retirement
trajectories than men. They also seem to be less interested in gradual retirement.
Preferences for early or late retirement hardly vary with education level, but the
higher educated have a stronger preference for gradual retirement than other educa-
tional groups. Respondents living with a partner have a stronger preference for all
forms of early retirement and an accordingly larger distaste for late retirement than
respondents not living with a partner. The same applies to home owners versus
renters. The choices of the high income groups are more sensitive to the replace-
ment rate than those of lower income groups, particularly when it comes to early
retirement. Higher income respondents are also more interested in gradual retire-
ment. Full-time workers have the largest tendency to choose late gradual retirement,
while part-timers (working 16-32 hours per week) have the strongest preference for
early retirement or early gradual retirement. Comparing the simulated probabilities
over the years of the data collection, we nd that the attractiveness of all gradual
retirement scenarios is falling over time. This can also explain why we nd fewer
choices of gradual retirement than Van Soest et al. (2006). In 2008, we also nd a
substantially smaller tendency to choose early retirement and a somewhat increased
tendency to choose late retirement. These results may reect changing social norms.
4.2 Choice of Retirement Age
Table 7 considers the choice between the benchmark (retirement at age 65; replace-
ment rate 70%) and a scenario that is actuarially equivalent11 to the benchmark
but has a dierent retirement age. Gradual retirement is not considered here. The
actuarially fair replacement rates (in the second column) are taken from Queisser
and Whitehouse (2006), on the basis of a 2 % interest rate, average life expectancy
for OECD countries, and price indexation of pensions.
11Actuarial neutrality of pension trajectories requires that the present value of accrued pen-
sion benets for working an additional year is the same as in the year before. See Queisser and
Whitehouse (2006) for a discussion of actuarial neutrality and related concepts.
24Table 7: Probability of Choosing Actuarially Neutral Alternative rather than Bench-
mark Trajectory













Note: Acturial neutral retirement scenarios taken from Queisser and Whitehouse (2006).
They are calculated for the OECD average based on a 2 % interest rate, average life
expectancy for OECD countries, and price indexation of pensions.
Like the previous table, the table presents the simulated probabilities of choosing
full retirement at the alternative age (third column). For example 19:8 % of all
people would prefer to retire at age 62 with a replacement rate of about 57% rather
than at age 65 with replacement rate 70%. The simulated probabilities show that
most people prefer standard retirement at age 65 to actuarially equivalent early as
well as late retirement.
In the remaining simulations we consider the choice between 11 options: retire-
ment at age 60;61;:::;69 or 70, without any opportunities for gradual retirement,
and for a variety of (retirement age dependent) replacement rates. The baseline case
is the set of 11 actuarially equivalent scenarios already presented in Table 7, but in-
stead of comparing each of these scenarios with the benchmark, we now consider the
choice between all 11 scenarios. Column \rr" of Table 8 presents the probability of
each choice averaged over the complete sample, as well as the corresponding average
retirement age for this baseline case.12 The mode is 65 years and the mean desired
retirement age is 65.08 years, corresponding to the symmetry we already found in
Table 7. Still there is also substantial dispersion, with, for example, more than 20%
choosing to retire at age 63 or earlier, and more than 23% opting for retirement at
12Both the unobserved heterogeneity terms and the optimization errors are taken into account.
25age 67 or later.
Table 8: Income Eect on Preferred Retirement Age
age prob. distribution of preferred retirement age (in %)
rr 0.7 rr 0.8 rr 0.9 rr 1.1 rr 1.2 rr 1.3 rr
60 0.83 0.94 0.89 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.80
61 2.32 1.87 2.00 2.15 2.54 2.78 3.08
62 5.77 3.83 4.39 5.03 6.62 7.60 8.71
63 11.38 7.12 8.39 9.81 13.10 14.95 16.90
64 17.59 11.50 13.48 15.53 19.59 21.43 23.01
65 20.97 15.78 17.80 19.57 21.90 22.34 22.32
66 17.88 17.04 17.88 18.15 17.10 15.92 14.45
67 12.84 16.49 15.73 14.46 11.02 9.19 7.44
68 6.78 12.71 10.73 8.70 5.10 3.69 2.57
69 2.78 8.26 6.00 4.18 1.77 1.08 0.62
70 0.86 4.47 2.71 1.57 0.44 0.21 0.10
mean age (years) 65.08 65.95 65.63 65.35 64.83 64.61 64.41
dierence (months) 0 10.44 6.60 3.24 -3.00 -5.64 -8.04
Note: In this table we change the pension wealth in actuarially neutral trajectories and
study its impact on the mean age. In column "rr" we let people choose between all
eleven scenarios with full retirement at ages 60 to 70 and replacement rates in Table 7.
In columns "1.1 rr", "1.2 rr" and "1.3 rr" we increase these replacement rates by 10 %,
20 % and 30 %, respectively. In columns "0.9 rr", "0.8 rr" and "0.7 rr" we decrease these
replacement rates as indicated. In each column, we give the probability distributions of
preferred retirement age, the mean retirement age measured in years and the dierence
between this and the mean retirement age and the baseline choice set "rr".
The other columns of the table give insight in the \(pension) income eect" on
the preferred retirement age, i.e. how does the preferred retirement age change if the
total value of life-time pension income changes, irrespective of the retirement age.
To compute it, we increased or decreased the replacement rates in all 11 scenarios
by a xed percentage { 10, 20 or 30 % { and calculated the simulated probabilities
for each new choice set. These simulated probabilities are presented in the other
columns of Table 8, labeled \0.7 rr" (replacement rates reduced by 30%), \0.8 rr",:::,
\1.3 rr".
An increase in the replacement rates makes early retirement more attractive
and makes late retirement less attractive: in columns \1.1 rr", \1.2 rr" and \1.3
rr" we observe a gradual increase of early retirement choices and a decrease of late
26Figure 2: Income Eect on the Preferred Retirement Age - Probability distribution


































retirement choices. For example, the probability to retire at age 63 or earlier rises
from 20.3% in the baseline case (\rr") to 29.3% when all pension incomes would
be raised by 30%. At the same time, the percentage retiring at age 67 or later
would fall from 23.3% to 10.7%. For the lower replacement rates (columns \0.9 rr",
\0.8 rr" and \0.7 rr") we observe the opposite trend. A graphical illustration of
these shifts in probability distributions for changing pension incomes is presented in
Figure 2. These changes can be seen as pure income eects, since the accruals, i.e.,
the rewards for retiring earlier or later, do not change (in relative terms), implying
that the substitution eects are zero. The implied results for the average retirement
age show that the income eects are of the expected negative sign and substantial:
a 10% increase in all replacement rates would, for example, reduce the average age
of preferred retirement by three months (see the bottom rows of the table).
The income eect can be compared with the \pension wealth" eect found by
Euwals et al. (2007) who analyze preferences for early retirement of Dutch public
sector employees, using administrative data from the main public sector pension
fund. They nd that reducing pension wealth by 100,000 euros would induce the
average worker to postpone retirement by 5 or 6 months (p.21). The lump sum
27of 100,000 euros corresponds to an annuity of about 25% of average pre-retirement
earnings and is therefore similar to an increase of the replacement rate by somewhat
more than 30%. According to our estimates, this would raise the average retirement
age by more than 8 months, which is larger than the result of Euwals et al. This
is not so surprising since we look at desired retirement instead of actual retirement
and allow for quite exible choices (any retirement age from age 60 to 70), while the
literature provides evidence that retirement choices are often much more restricted
and certainly in the Netherlands, actual opportunities for retiring after age 65 are
scarce (cf., e.g, Van Solinge and Henkens (2007)).
With some additional assumptions, we can also roughly compare these income
eects with the \wealth eects" found by Brown et al. (2006) who look at the
eect of (expected and unexpected) inheritances on retirement using the US Health
and Retirement Study. One of their dependent variables is the two-year (i.e., wave
to wave) retirement rate, with a sample average of 19.2% (Table 5 in Brown et
al.). They nd that a $100;000 inheritance increases this rate by about 2.1%-
points. To compare this with our ndings, we consider the retirement rate at age
62 or age 63, which is 17.7% in our baseline case with actuarially fair trade os
((5.77+11.38)/(100-0.83-2.32), see Table 8). A $100;000 lump sum transfer at age
62 would roughly correspond to an annuity of about 15 to 20% of average annual pre-
retirement earnings. The retirement rate at age 62 or 63 for this higher replacement
rate can be derived from the columns \1.2 rr" and is about 22.6%, 4.9%-points
higher than in the baseline case. This is much larger than the 2.1% found by Brown
et al. Note, however, that in their later analysis, Brown et al. nd larger eects of
unexpected inheritances than of expected inheritances, a distinction not made for
this particular estimate, and our estimate probably corresponds more to the eect
of an unexpected inheritance13.
In Table 9 we present the income eects on the mean preferred retirement age
for dierent socioeconomic groups. The rst column concerns the baseline case. The
main dierences across socio-economic groups here are the age dierences: the age
groups 45-64 prefer to retire earlier than the younger and older age groups. The
other columns present the income eects in terms of changes (in months) of the
average preferred retirement age, computed in the same way as in the bottom row
of Table 8. The sign of the income eect is the same for all subgroups, but there is
13We cannot compare our estimates to these later estimates of Brown et al., since these use the
dependent variable \retiring earlier than expected" which we cannot construct. Substantial nega-
tive income eects for Dutch workers are also implied by the simulation results of Mastrogiacomo
et al. (2004, p.790); the magnitude of these eects is not comparable to our estimates since they
look at changes in pre-retirement wages.
28some variation in magnitude. For example, the income eects increase with socio-
economic status (education level and income) and are relatively small for workers
with a small part-time job.
Table 9: Income Eects on Mean Preferred Retirement Age by Socioeconomic Group
retirement age
rr 0.7 rr 0.8 rr 0.9 rr 1.1 rr 1.2 rr 1.3 rr
all 65.08 10.44 6.60 3.24 -3.00 -5.64 -8.04
age 44- 65.28 10.80 6.92 3.33 -3.06 -5.88 -8.50
age 45-54 64.52 9.96 6.31 3.01 -2.74 -5.25 -7.57
age 55-64 64.59 8.74 5.55 2.63 -2.41 -4.62 -6.66
age 65+ 65.93 11.40 7.40 3.60 -3.39 -6.55 -9.47
male 65.20 10.64 6.82 3.28 -3.03 -5.82 -8.41
female 64.86 9.70 6.18 2.95 -2.71 -5.22 -7.53
education low 65.04 9.20 5.89 2.83 -2.61 -5.02 -7.25
education mid 64.94 9.89 6.31 3.02 -2.77 -5.31 -7.67
education high 65.21 11.30 7.24 3.48 -3.22 -6.19 -8.94
partner 64.98 10.18 6.50 3.12 -2.87 -5.51 -7.95
no partner 65.38 10.65 6.84 3.29 -3.05 -5.88 -8.50
house rented 65.44 10.73 6.90 3.33 -3.10 -5.95 -8.60
house own 64.96 10.15 6.48 3.10 -2.85 -5.48 -7.92
income low 65.01 8.23 5.25 2.52 -2.34 -4.48 -6.48
income mid 65.05 10.30 6.59 3.16 -2.90 -5.58 -8.06
income high 65.18 11.42 7.31 3.51 -3.25 -6.25 -9.03
working hours 15- 64.97 6.33 4.04 1.93 -1.78 -3.40 -4.95
working hours 16-32 64.83 10.98 7.01 3.35 -3.07 -5.91 -8.51
working hours 33+ 65.18 10.46 6.69 3.22 -2.97 -5.72 -8.26
wave 1 65.11 10.01 6.41 3.07 -2.83 -5.46 -7.87
wave 2 64.97 11.54 7.37 3.53 -3.25 -6.24 -9.01
wave 3 65.19 8.99 5.76 2.77 -2.56 -4.92 -7.12
Note: Income eects are calculated as in Table 8. In column "rr", we let the given
group choose between all eleven scenarios with full retirement at ages from 60 to 70 and
replacement rates "rr" from Table 7. We present the mean preferred retirement age (in
years) by group. In other columns we change the replacement rates as indicated and
calculate the dierences (in months) between the new mean and the mean in the baseline
(column "rr"). The dierences in the row "all" correspond to the dierences in Table 8.
29Substitution eects on the retirement age are presented in Table 10. The baseline
(column \rr") is the same as in Table 8. The alternatives do not change generosity
of pensions when retiring at age 65, but increase or decrease the accruals, i.e.,
the rewards for retiring later or the penalty for retiring earlier, giving \atter" or
\steeper" relationships between the retirement age and the replacement rate. To be
precise, the new replacement rates are equal to 70 + x(rr   70), where rr are the
replacement rates in the actuarially neutral scenarios (Table 7), 70 is the replacement
rate in the benchmark scenario with retirement age 65 and x is a multiplication
factor. For example for x = 0:5 the new replacement rate when retiring at age 60
is equal to 70 + 0:5(50:26   70) = 60:13%, for retirement age 61 it is 70 + 0:5 
(53:45   70) = 61:73%, etc. If x is equal to 1, the replacement rates are those of
the baseline case with actuarially equivalent trajectories. If 0  x < 1, the accruals
are negative and early retirement scenarios become nancially more attractive. If
x > 1, accruals are positive, implying a stronger nancial incentive to retire later.
In our simulation, we consider x equal to 0;0:33;0:5;1;2 and 3. In the extreme case,
x = 0, the replacement rate is equal to 70 irrespective of the retirement age.
In the baseline choice set \rr", people on average prefer to retire at age 65:1,
as we saw before. With the positive accruals in column \70+2(rr-70)", the average
retirement age would increase by almost one year, since later retirement is made
more attractive. For example, the percentage preferring to retire at age 67 or later
would increase from 23.3% to 44.9%, while the percentage wanting to retire at age
63 or earlier would drop from 20.3% to 10.3%. On the other hand, if the accruals are
reduced so much that the only \penalty" for retiring early is a lower income during
the years of early retirement (column \70"), the average retirement age would fall
by almost 1.75 years, with about 56% wanting to retire at age 63 or earlier. The
main reason why many respondents do not choose to retire even earlier according
to our model estimations is the eect of age on utility when retired, which implies
that, keeping income constant, for many respondents retirement is less attractive
than pre-retirement at age 60 or 61.
30Table 10: Substitution Eect on the Preferred Retirement Age
age Distribution of preferred retirement age (in %)
rr 70 70+0.33(rr-70)70+0.5(rr-70) 70+2(rr-70) 70+3(rr-70) 90,70
60 0.83 1.69 0.97 0.85 1.35 2.39 5.09
61 2.32 8.50 4.82 3.80 1.45 0.80 17.25
62 5.77 19.72 12.98 10.44 2.54 1.30 27.48
63 11.38 26.21 21.38 18.52 5.00 2.69 25.63
64 17.59 22.62 23.61 22.69 9.51 5.75 15.34
65 20.97 13.50 18.73 20.26 15.97 11.71 5.98
66 17.88 5.67 10.69 13.08 19.23 17.47 2.39
67 12.84 1.69 4.78 6.78 20.16 23.07 0.68
68 6.78 0.35 1.57 2.61 14.37 19.27 0.14
69 2.78 0.05 0.40 0.78 7.59 11.25 0.02
70 0.86 0.00 0.08 0.18 2.82 4.31 0.00
mean age (years) 65.08 63.34 63.98 64.27 66.07 66.58 62.61
dierence (months) 0.00-20.88 -13.20 -9.72 11.88 18.00-29.64
Note: In column "rr", we let people choose between eleven actuarially equivalent scenarios
with full retirement at ages from 60 to 70 and replacement rates "rr" in Table 7. In other
columns labeled "70+x(rr-70)", we change replacement rates as indicated (see the text
for an example). In column "90,70", the replacement rates are all equal to 90 till age 65
and 70 from age 65. In each column, we give the probability distribution of the preferred
retirement age, the mean retirement age (in years) and its dierence (in months) with the
mean retirement age for the baseline choice set "rr".
The substitution eect can be compared with the \price eect" of Euwals et al.
(2007) who nd that increasing the peak value by 100,000 euros would induce a
worker to postpone retirement by about 8 months. Changing from column \rr" to
column \70+3(rr-70)" increases the reward for postponing retirement in terms of
pension income per year at age 65 from 5%-points to 15%-points of pre-retirement
earnings, corresponding to a change in peak value (dened as the increase in lifetime
wealth if the worker decides to continue working for one year) of about 40,000 euros
for the average worker. Our estimates would imply that this increases the average
retirement age by 18 months. The substitution eect we nd is therefore much
larger than the eect found by Euwals et al. (2007). As for the income eect, a
plausible explanation for the dierence is that we look at desired retirement allowing
for maximum exibility - each age between 60 and 70 is possible, whereas Euwals
31et al. (2007) consider actual retirement, which may also be aected by implicit or
explicit restrictions imposed by the employer like mandatory retirement at age 65.
The nal column of Table 10 (column \90,70") shows the response to an arrange-
ment that mimics a stylized version of the generous early retirement arrangements in
the Netherlands and other countries as they existed in the nineties: a xed replace-
ment rate of 70% after age 65 (irrespective of the retirement age), and a replacement
rate of 90% between early retirement and age 65 (irrespective of the early retire-
ment age). As expected, this makes early retirement even more attractive than
the arrangement which also gives a replacement rate of 70% in the years between
early retirement and age 65. More than 75% would prefer to retire at age 63 or
earlier, and almost 50% of the respondents would choose retirement at age 62 or
earlier. Retirement at age 60 remains uncommon, because of the estimated negative
utility of retirement at this age. The average retirement age would drop by almost
30 months compared to the baseline choice set with actuarially equivalent choices.
This estimate ts in the range of estimates given by Kapteyn and De Vos (2004,
p. 493) who simulate a \common reform" from the actual system with generous
early retirement opportunities to an approximately actuarially fair system with re-
tirement between age 60 and age 65. Depending on their model specication, they
nd smaller or larger eects than we do. Again, we would expect to nd larger
eects than Kapteyn et al. (2004) because we also allow for retirement beyond age
65.
Table 11, presents the substitution eect for various socioeconomic groups. The
rst column is the same as in Tabls 9, giving the average preferred retirement age
for the baseline of actuarially fair choices. The other columns show the substitution
eects expressed as the number of months the average preferred retirement age by
subgroup changes when the rewards for retiring later increase or decrease (as in the
nal row of Table 10). The results are comparable to those in Table 9: the groups
with the higher income eects also have the higher substitution eects (high income,
high education level). The group of respondents with a small part-time job generally
seems less sensitive to nancial incentives than all other groups.
32Table 11: Substitution Eect on the Mean Preferred Retirement Age by Socioeco-
nomic Group
retirement age
rr 7070+0.33(rr-70)70+0.5(rr-70) 70+2(rr-70) 70+3(rr-70) 90,70
all 65.08 -20.88 -13.20 -9.72 11.88 18.00 -29.64
age 44- 65.28 -21.86 -13.85 -9.93 12.25 18.30 -31.20
age 45-54 64.52 -20.25 -13.15 -9.54 12.77 19.55 -28.44
age 55-64 64.59 -17.37 -11.23 -8.14 10.94 16.81 -24.48
age 65+ 65.93 -23.65 -14.66 -10.37 11.73 17.14 -33.72
male 65.20 -21.67 -13.75 -9.85 12.23 18.33 -30.84
female 64.86 -19.60 -12.55 -9.05 11.65 17.65 -27.60
education low 65.04 -18.46 -11.74 -8.44 10.74 16.25 -26.04
education mid 64.94 -19.90 -12.72 -9.15 11.80 17.88 -28.08
education high 65.21 -23.24 -14.76 -10.58 13.00 19.41 -33.12
partner 64.98 -20.66 -13.19 -9.49 12.06 18.21 -29.28
no partner 65.38 -21.68 -13.67 -9.77 11.88 17.69 -30.84
house rented 65.44 -21.88 -13.77 -9.83 11.87 17.66 -31.08
house own 64.96 -20.59 -13.16 -9.47 12.06 18.22 -29.16
income low 65.01 -16.29 -10.33 -7.43 9.46 14.30 -22.80
income mid 65.05 -20.85 -13.30 -9.55 12.12 18.30 -29.64
income high 65.18 -23.55 -14.96 -10.74 13.21 19.73 -33.60
work hrs 15- 64.97 -12.03 -7.58 -5.41 6.85 10.21 -16.44
work hrs 16-32 64.83 -22.54 -14.49 -10.44 13.39 20.23 -31.92
work hrs 33+ 65.18 -21.23 -13.47 -9.66 12.05 18.11 -30.12
wave 1 65.11 -20.16 -12.81 -9.20 11.60 17.48 -28.68
wave 2 64.97 -23.90 -15.28 -11.00 13.76 20.65 -33.96
wave 3 65.19 -17.85 -11.29 -8.09 10.20 15.39 -25.20
Note: Substitution eects are calculated as in Table 10. In column "rr", the choices are
between all eleven scenarios with full retirement at ages from 60 to 70 and replacement
rates "rr" from Table 7. We present the mean preferred retirement age (in years) by group.
In other columns replacement rates imply positive or negative accruals as indicated, and
the dierences (in months) between the new mean and the mean in the baseline (column
"rr") is presented. The dierences in the row "all" correspond to those in Table 10.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of the simulated income and substitu-
tion eects presented in Tables 8 and 10 on the preferred retirement age for some of
the specication choices made in our model. We compare the results of the bench-
33mark model, from now on referred to as M0, to those of ve alternative models,
named M1, M2, M3, M4 and M5. The estimated income eects are presented in
Table 12, and Table 13 presents the substitution eects.
Table 12: Sensitivity Analysis Income Eect on Preferred Retirement Age
retirement age
rr 0.7 rr 0.8 rr 0.9 rr 1.1 rr 1.2 rr 1.3 rr
M0 mean 65.08 65.95 65.63 65.35 64.83 64.61 64.41
dif 0.00 10.44 6.60 3.24 -3.00 -5.64 -8.04
M1 mean 65.11 65.80 65.56 65.33 64.91 64.72 64.53
dif 0.00 8.25 5.34 2.61 -2.45 -4.71 -6.99
M2 mean 65.09 65.92 65.62 65.32 64.86 64.63 64.43
dif 0.00 10.03 6.41 2.83 -2.76 -5.54 -7.96
M3 mean 65.08 65.93 65.62 65.36 64.84 64.64 64.43
dif 0.00 10.14 6.52 3.31 -2.85 -5.23 -7.81
M4 mean 65.29 65.72 65.55 65.42 65.16 65.07 64.95
dif 0.00 5.16 3.12 1.50 -1.61 -2.71 -4.11
M5 mean 64.96 66.07 65.67 65.31 64.64 64.34 64.07
dif 0.00 13.35 8.55 4.17 -3.88 -7.42 -10.74
Note: M0 - benchmark model of Section 3; M1 - M0 with term y2
(yist)
2 added to right
hand side in eq. 2; M2 - M0 but observed characteristics Xis are just sex and age; M3
- M0 but observed characteristics Xis are just sex, age, education and partner; M4 - M0
with xed discount factor  = 0:95; M5 - M0 with xed discount factor  = 0:85.
Model M1 extends the benchmark model by adding a quadratic term y2y2
ist
to the right hand side of equation 2. Dierences in the simulated income eects
and substitution eects calculated using model M1 and the benchmark model M0
are small. The estimated parameter y2 is not signicantly dierent from zero. It
demonstrates that extending the benchmark model with a quadratic term of log
income neither leads to a better t nor to dierent conclusions.
Models M2 and M3 are simplied versions of the benchmark model M0. They
both incorporate fewer observed characteristics Xis than M0. Model M2 uses just
sex and age of the respondents while model M3 includes sex, age, education and
partnership status. Compared to Model M0, M3 drops income, number of paid
working hours and home ownership, variables which might be determined by the
same unobserved characteristics that drive the tastes for work versus leisure and
therefore also retirement preferences, so that their eects are not necessarily causal.
As shown in Tables 12 and 13, the dierences in the simulated income and substitu-
34tion eects of models M0, M2 and M3 are negligible, demonstrating the robustness
of our results for including these variables that are in a sense potentially endogenous.
Table 13: Sensitivity Analysis Substitution Eect on Preferred Retirement Age
retirement age
rr 7070+0.33(rr-70)70+0.5(rr-70) 70+2(rr-70) 70+3(rr-70) 90,70
M0 mean 65.08 63.34 63.98 64.27 66.07 66.58 62.61
dif 0.00 -20.88 -13.20 -9.72 11.88 18.00 -29.64
M1 mean 65.11 63.38 64.02 64.33 66.14 66.61 62.64
dif 0.00 -20.73 -13.11 -9.40 12.39 18.05 -29.67
M2 mean 65.09 63.37 64.01 64.31 66.08 66.60 62.66
dif 0.00 -20.59 -12.88 -9.25 12.00 18.20 -29.14
M3 mean 65.08 63.36 63.97 64.29 66.09 66.59 62.65
dif 0.00 -20.67 -13.27 -9.46 12.06 18.08 -29.20
M4 mean 65.29 63.71 64.26 64.53 66.28 66.78 63.41
dif 0.00 -18.96 -12.36 -9.12 11.88 17.88 -22.56
M5 mean 64.96 63.15 63.84 64.15 65.94 66.45 62.10
dif 0.00 -21.78 -13.47 -9.70 11.74 17.86 -34.29
Note: M0 - benchmark model of Section 3; M1 - M0 with term y2
(yist)
2 added to right
hand side in eq. 2; M2 - M0 but observed characteristics in Xis are just sex and age; M3
- M0 but observed characteristics Xis are just sex, age, education and partner; M4 - M0
with xed discount factor  = 0:95; M5 - M0 with xed discount factor  = 0:85.
Finally, we consider two models in which the discount rate is xed to a given
value rather than estimated. The discount rate appeared to be numerically the
hardest parameter to estimate - with a xed discount rate, estimating the model
appeared to be much faster than when also estimating the discount rate. This is why
we wanted to investigate the consequences of setting the discount rate to a specic
value. In the benchmark model M0 the estimated discount factor is  = 0:89. In
models M4 and M5 we set the discount factor to 0:95 and 0:85, respectively. The
results in Table 12 show that the income eects crucially depend on the discount
rate. Setting the discount rate to a very low value (0.85, model M5) leads to much
larger estimates of the income elasticities than setting it to a higher value (0.95,
model M4) { in the latter model, the estimates are less than half as large as the
estimates in the former model. The benchmark model with its estimated discount
rate of 0.90 gives income eects in between those of the models with  = 0:85 and
 = 0:95.
35On the other hand, the columns in Table 13 except the last one show that the
discount rate hardly aects the estimates of the substitution eects. The eects in
the nal column of this table, the simulation mimicking the generous early retirement
opportunities of the nineties, are a combination of (negative) income and (negative)
substitution eects. Accordingly, model M5 with the largest negative income eects
also gives the largest negative eect of changing from actuarially fair trade-os to
this system that rewards early retirement. In Model M4 the negative income eect
is much smaller, leading to a total eect that is also much smaller than according
to the model with estimated discount rate. This leads to the conclusion that xing
the discount rate to the wrong value may bias the estimates of the eects of policy
simulations.
6 Conclusion
Our paper analyzes retirement preferences using stated preference data. We work
with unbalanced panel data on Dutch individuals, collected in 2006, 2007 and 2008.
In each year, respondents evaluated four types of hypothetical retirement scenarios
- standard retirement (age 65), late full retirement, early full retirement and partial
retirement. To study the preferences over dierent retirement trajectories in detail,
we use an intertemporal utility model of labour force participation and income for
periods of work and retirement. The model is estimated by simulated maximum
likelihood.
One of the main ndings is that people prefer gradual retirement trajectories to
the benchmark retirement trajectory (retirement age 65, replacement rate 70 %),
although these oer actuarially less income than the benchmark trajectory. Most
people do not wish to work full time to high ages even if relatively high income in
retirement period is oered. The fraction of people willing to work very long can be
increased if we allow for gradual retirement. Gradual retirement seems therefore to
be an appropriate tool to keep older people working.
Another key nding concerns the change of preferences over time. Taking into
account the results presented in both our study and in Van Soest et al. (2006),
which uses data collected by CentER in year 2004, we can observe a decrease in
preferences for early retirement and an increase in preferences for late retirement in
period 2004-2008. This may reect changes in social norms.
We study the income eect on preferred retirement age. First, we let people
choose between retirement scenarios with full retirement at ages between 60-70 years
which are actuarially equivalent to the benchmark scenario. Then people could
36choose between all actuarially neutral scenarios with higher or lower pension income
levels than in the benchmark choice set. We nd that the income eect is negative
and substantial. The preferred retirement age for the benchmark choice set is 65:1
years. The increase of pension income by 10 % lowers the preferred retirement age
by 3 months. A decrease of the income by 10 % increases the preferred retirement
age by 3:2 months.
Similarly, we calculate the substitution eect by changing the accruals, keeping
the replacement rate when retiring at the normal retirement age of 65 at its bench-
mark value of 70%. We nd substantial substitution eects. For example, reducing
the accruals to half their actuarially neutral values would reduce the average retire-
ment age by almost 10 months. The results also explain the popularity of generous
early retirement opportunities as they existed in the Netherlands until the nineties
- according to our simulations they reduced the average retirement age of those who
had access to them by almost 2.5 years.
Our model can be extended in several ways. It would be reasonable to include for
example savings or joint decision making of spouses. Changing the formulation of
the hypothetical retirement scenarios should be considered, to make the hypothetical
retirement options more understandable for the surveyed people.
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